Comanagement: Merging the ESA with Political Pressure to Create a Viable Alternative to ESA Listing by Pacey, Stephanie
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary
Volume 21 | Issue 1 Article 4
3-15-2001
Comanagement: Merging the ESA with Political
Pressure to Create a Viable Alternative to ESA
Listing
Stephanie Pacey
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Animal Law Commons, and the Environmental Law
Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephanie Pacey, Comanagement: Merging the ESA with Political Pressure to Create a Viable Alternative to ESA Listing, 21 J. Nat’l Ass’n
Admin. L. Judges. (2001)
available at http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol21/iss1/4
COMANAGEMENT: MERGING THE ESA WITH
POLITICAL PRESSURE TO CREATE A VIABLE
ALTERNATIVE TO ESA LISTING
STEPHANIE PACEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over seventy species of whale and dolphin exist.' Whale
populations have faced many forms of exploitation over the
centuries, including commercial whaling.2 As humans pro-
gressed technologically, and adopted more efficient hunting
techniques, the chances of a hunted whale escaping de-
creased and populations started rapidly diminishing.' Al-
though the International Whaling Commission (IWC) was
formed in 1949, its authority was largely ignored.4 Whaling
may have reached its peak in 1961, when over 66,000
whales were killed in that year alone.' The first decrease in
whaling was due to the inability of hunters to locate any
prey.' Eventually, regulations such as the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (MMPA)7 and the Endangered Species Act
(ESA)s were implemented, providing a starting point for the
conservation and recovery of many species of whales.9
* Third-year law student at Pepperdine University School of Law.
1. The World Wide Fund for Nature, The Whale in History and Culture,
at
http: //www.panda.org/resources/publications/water/w-whales/page3.ht
m (last visited July 21, 2001).
2. Id.
3. IcL
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421
(2000).
8. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
9. Id.
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Beluga whales were traditionally harvested for their
blubber, or muktuk.'0 Muktuk is a staple of the Alaskan
native diet, and the hunting of beluga whales is a cultural
tradition dating back hundreds of years.l1 Along with be-
ing the focus of much predation, beluga whales concur-
rently faced habitat destruction, pollution, and decreased
food availability.12 One particular population, the Cook
Inlet stock of beluga whales, were over-hunted and headed
toward extinction.13 In the mid-1990s, it was discovered
that natives in the Cook Inlet area were taking advantage of
a certain provision of the MMPA.14 The provision was cre-
ated to allow exchange of beluga muktuk within a village,
but created a loophole "allowing" the sale of muktuk com-
mercially.15 This resulted in a loss of 340 whales between
1994 and 1998.16
This article considers the plight of Cook Inlet beluga
whales, and how development and use of comanagement
techniques can operate to manage and preserve endan-
gered species. Through the cooperation of managing ad-
ministrative agencies, the listing process under the ESA is
no longer necessary to preserve the beluga whale due to
the viability of comanagement as an alternative.
Part II of this article covers the scientific background of
the primary example used, beluga whales. It also provides
some insight into the political controversy in the Cook Inlet
area." Part III focuses on the ESA listing process. Its op-
eration is detailed, along with problems associated with
listing. Next, the role of political pressure in the ultimate
decision is considered, followed by a comparison with the
10. Nancy Lord, Two Worlds, One Whale: The Belugas of Alaska's Cook
Inlet are the Victims of a Cultural Divide Between Science and Tradition, SI-
ERRA MAGAZINE (Sierra Club July/August 2000), available at
http: //www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200007/belugawhale.asp [hereinafter
Lord, Two Worlds].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Lord, Two Worlds, supra note 10.
17. See discussion infra Part II.A-B.
similar MMPA listing process. 8 Part IV discusses coman-
agement, and more specifically, its development, goals, and
a specific example for application. 9
II. BACKGROUND
A. Scientific Background
Cook Inlet is an area in Alaska that was faced with a
dramatic decrease of one of their most important re-
sources, the beluga whale.19 The beluga whale, or Del-
phinapterus Leucas, is a small white whale found in the
Arctic.2 ° It is a member of the group Odonticeti, or toothed
whale.2 ' Male belugas range in length from twelve to fifteen
feet, while females average ten to twelve feet.22 The average
weights of these whales are 1,300 to 2,300 pounds and 900
to 1,400 pounds, respectively.23 The total world population
of belugas is believed to be between 60,000 and 100,000.24
Instead of the common dorsal fin, belugas have a dorsal
ridge that is used to break through thin sea ice in order for
them to breathe. 25 Mating occurs in spring or early sum-
mer.26  Calves are then born after a twelve to fourteen-
month gestation period.2 1 Calves are a dark gray-brown
color when born, turning completely white only after ado-
lescence.28 The average lifespan of a beluga is twenty-five
18. See discussion infra Part III.A-D.
19. See discussion infra Part IV.A-C.
20. Designation of the Cook Inlet, Alaska, Stock of Beluga Whale as
Depleted Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) and Response
to Petitions, 64 Fed. Reg. 56298-01 (1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
216) (proposed Oct. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Proposed Depleted Designation].
21. Id.
22. TONY MARTIN, BELUGA WHALES 12 (1996).
23. Id.
24. STEFANI PAINE, THE WORLD OF THE ARcnc WHALES: BELUGS, BOW-lEADS,
AND NARwHALs 19 (Nancy Flight, ed., 1995).
25. MARTIN, supra note 22, at 15.
26. PAINE, supra note 24, at 23.
27. MARTIN, supra note 22, at 27.
28. Id. at 12.
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years, with a few whales living to be forty.29
The total beluga whale population of around 100,000
animals is made up of twenty-nine separate stocks.3"
Alaska's coast holds five separate and distinct beluga
whale stocks, the Cook Inlet population ranking as the
smallest." This stock is also the most genetically distinct
of the five stocks, partially due to the barrier the Alaskan
Peninsula imposes. 2 This effectively keeps the Cook Inlet
stock from intermingling with any other population. "'
The suspected decline in Cook Inlet beluga whales was
confirmed when results from the National Marine Fisheries
Service's (NMFS) annual survey were released. 34 The sur-
vey, comprised of aerial surveys, abundance estimates, and
traditional observations, revealed significant results.35 The
1998 stock (347 animals) was half of the 1994 total (653
animals).36 Results from surveys taken prior to 1994 are
not available, but local hunters set the estimate at over
1,000 animals in the 1980s. 37
Numbers for those animals taken through subsistence
hunting are, for the most part, unreported.3" However, the
NMFS, with help from several hunter groups and individual
hunters, estimates a mean level of eighty-seven whales
taken annually.39
B. Political Controversy in the Cook Inlet Area
Alaskan Natives naturally have a concern for their cul-
tural traditions, 40 and the hunting of beluga whales plays a
29. Id. at 30.
30. See Lord, Two Worlds, supra note 10, at 1.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Proposed Depleted Designation, supra note 20, at 56303.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 56298.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See PAINE, supra note 24, at 101.
large part in that culture.4 1 Hunting and use of the whale
products are practices they feel are necessary to their cul-
tural identity.42 Restrictions must be put in place, how-
ever, to regulate both the number of whales taken and the
purposes for which they are used.43
On the other hand, environmental groups are concerned
with the impending extinction of some of the world's most
beautiful animals.4 4  Subsistence takes are the largest
cause of low numbers and environmental groups feel that it
is their responsibility to intercede.4" They represent whale
enthusiasts and those who want to watch, research, and
enjoy these animals in their natural environment.46
III. EsA LISTING PROCESS
The ESA historically served as the main protection for
declining species. With time, the level of protection offered
proved to be less effective than that required by diminish-
ing species.47
A. Operation
The ESA is an act designed to protect valuable species
and conserve the habitat necessary for their survival. 48 The
listing process is the first step in designating a species as
"threatened" or "endangered."4 9 Marine species are listed
by the NMFS headed by the Secretary of Commerce (Secre-
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 98.
44. See id. at 101.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Matthew J. Rizzo, The Endangered Species Act and Federal Agency
Inaction, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 855, 856 (1994). Other comprehensive
discussions regarding the ESA are available. See generally Oliver A. Houck,
The Endangered Species Act and its Implementation by the U.S. Departments
of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. CoLO. L. REv. 277, 279 (1993); James C.
Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act Under the Microscope: A Closeup
Look From a Litigator's Perspective, 21 ENvTL. L. 499 (1991).
48. See Rizzo, supra note 47, at 885.
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (a)-(c) (2000).
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tary).50
The three listing categories designated by NMFS are
"threatened," "endangered," or "similar to a listed species
without actually being listed.""1 The Secretary determines
that a species is endangered when it is "in danger of extinc-
tion throughout all or a significant part of its range."52 A
threatened species is one likely to become endangered in
the foreseeable future.5 3 A species with sufficient similarity
to an endangered or threatened species may be treated as
such, although it is not officially listed. 4 The protection of
these animals, however, is not as complete as that in the
prior categories.5 5
Either the agency or a private party may initiate the list-
ing of a species.5 6 Private party petitions call for a ninety-
day period in which the agency determines the presence or
absence of "substantial information" to support the list-
ing. 7 With a favorable determination, the agency then has
one year to determine a finding of one of the following: (1)
the petition is not warranted, (2) the petition is warranted,
or (3) the petition is warranted, but presently precluded by
higher-priority listing proposals.5 8 The decision is then
published in the Federal Register.5 9 An emergency listing
procedure is also available, allowing the Secretary to im-
mediately list a species when a significant risk to its well-
being exists. 0
50. Id. § 1533(a).
51. Id. § 1533 (a)-(c).
52. See id. §§ 1532(6), 1533(a).
53. See id. §§ 1532(20), 1533(a).
54. See id.
55. Id. § 1533(e). Takes of these similar species are allowed through
proper permitting. 50 C.F.R. § 17.52 (2000).
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)-(b) (2000).
57. See id. § 1533(b)(3).
58. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B). In the case of a determination of "not war-
ranted," the process will end. Id. at §1533 (b)(3)(B)(i). In the case of a "war-
ranted" finding, the proposed rule is promptly published. Id. § 1533
(b)(3)(B)(ii). After the proposed rule is published and public comments con-
sidered, the agency is required to promulgate a rule, request a one-time six
month extension, or publish a notice of withdrawal within one year. Id. §
1533(b)(6).
59. Id. § 1533(b)(6)(A).
60. Id. § 1533 (b)(7). A thorough explanation of the emergency action is
Once the agency finds an action is warranted, the agency
must only consider five statutory criteria in making its
status decision: (1) the present or threatened destruction,
modification, or curtailment of its range or habitat; (2)
overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or
educational purposes; (3) disease or predation; (4) the in-
adequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or (5) other
natural or man-made factors affecting its continued exis-
tence.6' The Secretary is forbidden from considering eco-
nomic impacts while making this decision.12
After a species is designated as "threatened" or "endan-
gered," enforcement is implemented to ensure the species
recovery. Enforcement mechanisms include designating
critical habitat, developing and instituting recovery plans,
prohibiting takes, and ensuring the compliance of federal
agencies.'
required in the Federal Register. 50 C.F.R. § 424.20 (2000). In the case of
domestic animals, the Secretary must put the state authorities affected by
the action on notice. Id.
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2000).
62. Id. § 1533(b).
63. Id. § 1533. These areas are dealt with much more thoroughly in
section 4 and section 9 of the ESA. Id. § 1532(5)(A)(i). Critical habitat must
encompass food, shelter and breeding, or those things necessary to the spe-
cies' survival. In designating critical habitat, the Secretary must weigh the
"best scientific data available" against factors such as economic impacts. Id.
§ 1533(b)(1)(A). The final designation of critical habitat accompanies the final
rule listing the species. Id. § 1533(b)(2)-(8). Recovery plans are instituted by
the Secretary to promote conservation and survival of listed species. Id. §
1533(0(1). Recovery plans have a priority system, in which those species
that are likely to benefit the most are implemented first. Id. § 1533(f)(1)(A),
(h)(4). Endangered species are covered by the takings prohibition. Threat-
ened species are included if the Secretary finds it necessary to that species'
conservation. Id. § 1533(d). -Take" is defined as "harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect." Id. § 1532(19). Compli-
ance is required by federal agencies to ensure that their actions will not
harm listed species. Id. § 1536 (a)(2). This process begins by asking the Sec-
retary as to the presence or absence of any listed species in the area. Id. §
1536(a)(3). If there are listed species present, a biological assessment must
be prepared, outlining the impact the agency action would have. Id. §
1536(c)(1). If the species is likely to be affected, a formal consultation with
the Secretary is required. Id. § 1536(a) (3). A biological opinion is then issued
by the Secretary, including alternatives if the project would have an unac-
ceptable impact. Id. §1536(b)(3)(A). It is important to note that the agency
has ultimate responsibility regarding these matters. Id. § 1536.
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B. Problems with the ESA Listing Process
One of the major problems with the implementation of
the ESA is the delay associated with listing.8' It seems that
procedural delays are built into the act.65 The "warranted
but precluded" by other pending listing actions provision
creates an effective purgatory for those species that do not
meet the threshold danger level.66 Because of limited re-
sources, a disservice is being done to those animals that
fall behind in the waiting line.67 This is evidenced by the
average of a two to three year period between filing the peti-
tion and listing.68 The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) esti-
mate that three-dozen species succumbed to extinction
while waiting to be listed.69
Although many problems surround the ESA listing proc-
ess, one of the most important is the lack of funding.7 °
Lack of sufficient funding not only causes a lack of en-
forcement, but a lack of sufficient implementation as well.7'
Therefore, when the average cost to list a species is
$60,000, a congressional allotment of thirty to forty million
dollars is simply insufficient.72
The ESA is triggered only when a species is on the brink
of extinction.73 Only then, when the species is dangerously
close, does the ESA intervene. 74 Instead of acting as a pre-
ventative tool and implementing species' growth and con-
servation, it is an effective last resort, used to keep a re-
maining few alive. 75
The structure of the ESA encourages landowners who
64. John Charles Kunich, The Fallacy of Deathbed Conservation Under
the Endangered Species Act, 24 ENvTL. L. 501, 532 (1994).
65. Id. at 533.
66. Id.
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(i).
68. Kunich, supra note 64, at 534.
69. Id.
70. Rudy Abramson, Wildlife Act: Shield or Sword, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14,
1990, at Al.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Kunich, supra note 64, at 550.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 551-52.
find a threatened or endangered species on their land to
get rid of it.76 Instead of creating an incentive to protect
these species through monetary or other means, the ESA
makes it more amenable to destroy or suppress the species'
presence.7 7 Through completely restricting landowners'
property with no compensation in return, the ESA is rein-
forcing the problem it was created to resolve.7"
Limited time, money, and manpower are all factors in the
problem of delay.79 The ESA's purpose suffers at the hands
of bureaucracy, and the delays could "mean extinction for
species awaiting protection."8 °
The ESA has an uncanny ability to polarize involved par-
ties.8 1 Activists, as well as the media, incorrectly and much
too simplistically describe listing issues as "jobs versus
owls." 2 This quickly divides parties and causes a "break-
down of cooperation and communication."83 With no posi-
tive incentives offered to those negatively affected by the
listing process, the ESA suffers from a lack of respect and
confidence.8 4
C. Political Pressure and the Ultimate Decision
Interest groups make their opinions known in the listing
process through participating in a system set up by Con-
gress for the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and the
ESA. 5 Through this process, individuals make their con-
cerns known by submitting listing petitions to the FWS.
8 6
76. Mike Vivoli, Shoot, Shovel & Shut Up, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1992,
at F1.
77. Id.
78. Albert Gidari, The Endangered Species Act: Impact of Section 9 on
Private Landowners, 24 ENVTL. L. 419, 419 (1994).
79. Kunich, supra note 64, at 566.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Amy Whritenour Ando, Waiting to be Protected Under the Endan-
gered Species Act: The Political Economy of Regulatory Delay, 42 J. L. &
ECON. 29, 37 (1999).
86. Id. at 38.
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These petitions must "provid[e] substantive information
supporting the case for listing a species and carrying the
implicit threat of a lawsuit should the Service [FWS] act too
slowly on the case."87 Interest groups or interested indi-
viduals are encouraged to participate in the public com-
ment period, the effect of which strengthens or weakens
the agency's decision to list.88 Another available mechanism
is the request for hearings during the proposal period,89
which have the effect of creating uncertainty in the listing
decision by bringing different facts and viewpoints directly
to the attention of the agency.9 °
Theoretically, United States residents can ask their legis-
lator to intervene with an agency on their behalf. Legisla-
tors do have an incentive to be responsive to their constitu-
ents, however, constituents are typically split equally
between pro-environment and anti-restriction concerns. 9 1
Thus, the decision to intervene is completely at the legisla-
tor's discretion.9 2 Even when a legislator does intervene, the
level of influence that the legislator is able to exert requires
consideration by the constituent. If the legislator is a
member of a highly influential subcommittee, a constitu-
ent's request may be much better served.93
Thus, mechanisms designed to create a forum for indi-
viduals' voices can be ineffective. In fact, it is possible that
an individual's concern will not be truly noted or consid-
ered at all. " It can be argued, however, that this was the
intention of the ESA when it was enacted.95 The ESA was
specifically designed to effectively eliminate political pres-
sure from the process, leaving only the non-partisan
87. Id.
88. Id. See also Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure
Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q. J. EcON. 371, 374 (1983).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. John Jackson & John Kingdon, Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and
Legislative Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. Sci. 805, 811 (1992).
93. Id.
94. Ivan J. Lieben, Political Influences on USFWS Listing Decisions Un-
der the ESA: Time to Rethink Priorities, 27 ENVrL. L. 1323, 1327-29 (1997).
95. Id.
mechanisms listed above as recourse.9 6 Feeling frustrated
that their voices are not heard, however, interest groups
and individuals have begun to turn to mechanisms not
prescribed by Congress, such as political pressure. 97
A species is required to be listed based on an analysis of
the best available scientific data, with the assurance that
political pressure and economics are not considered in the
listing decision. 98 In reality, however, politics do play a
part in the listing process. 99 For example, in the recent
cases concerning the bull trout'0 0 and the Canadian lynx,'0
judges ruled that failure to list these species was contrary
to federal law."0 2 The reason the FWS did not list the bull
trout, rested on political controversy.10 3 The timber indus-
try complained that, if listed, the bull trout would bring
100 million additional acres of federal and private land un-
der federal control. 0 4 This governmental face-off against
the industries that rely on timber, grazing, and power gen-
eration by dams makes the FWS decision not to list seem
less based on the FWS's needs and more on political pres-
sure. 10 ' The Canadian lynx faces a similar situation in that
its existence depends on old-growth forest habitat, which
rapidly raises an adversary in the timber industry that
works against the lynx's ultimate survival.0 6 Tools used by
these anti-listing factions to pressure the FWS not to list
included political lobbying, lawsuits, and hiring their own
biologists to contradict the findings of FWS biologists. 1
07
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1327.
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000).
99. Lieben, supra note 94, at 1327.
100. See Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. United States Fish and Wild-
life Serv., 945 F. Supp. 1388 (D. Or. 1996).
101. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 958 F. Supp. 670 (D.D.C.
1997).
102. See id. See also, Friends of the Wild Swan, 945 F. Supp. at 1388.
103. See Friends of the Wild Swan, 945 F. Supp. at 1388.
104. Jonathon Brinckman, Federal Judge Orders New Look at Bull
Trout, OREGONIAN, Nov. 14, 1996, at D1.
105. Id.
106. See Defenders of Wildlife, 958 F. Supp. at 675.
107. See Lieben, supra note 94, at 1345.
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Before a species can be listed, it must receive a "favor-
able determination" from the FWS.'0 The FWS is given a
high level of discretion for this decision under the 1983
Endangered and Threatened Species Listing and Recovery
Priority Guidelines, due to the lack of well-defined criteria
needed to establish an easily recognized "magnitude and
immediacy of the threat of extinction" to that species."°9
Because of the broad discretion granted to the FWS, there
is room for the political process to affect these decision
makers, as evidenced by"' the effects of political pressure
in the case of the bull trout, discussed above."' After con-
sideration, the bull trout was given a priority ranking of
nine."' That ranking precluded it from being listed, as
other, higher priority rankings, were being given attention
at that time. "' Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. and the Alli-
ance for the Wild Rockies, Inc. then sued FWS, challenging
its decision not to list as arbitrary and capricious. 4 The
district court judge ruled that the FWS decision was indeed
arbitrary and capricious when examined using the APA's 115
standard of review." 6 The Service, according to the court:
... relied on factors which Congress had not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to con-
sider an important aspect of the problem, of-
fered an explanation for [the Service's] deci-
sion that runs counter to the evidence before
the agency, or is so implausible that it could
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (a)(2)(C) (2000).
109. Endangered and Threatened Species Listing and Recovery Priority
Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,098 (Sept. 21, 1983).
110. Lieben, supra note 94, at 1347.
111. Memorandum from the Regional Director, USFWS Region 1, to Di-
rector, USFWS, Warranted But Precluded Administrative 12-Month Finding
on a Petition to List the Bull Trout Under the Endangered Species Act (June
8, 1994) (on file with the Lewis & Clark College Law Library) [hereinafter
1994 Bull Trout Finding].
112. Id.
113. Id. at 25. The priority rankings listed were between one and six.
114. Friends of the Wild Swan, 945 F. Supp. at 1392-93.
115. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
116. Id.
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.117
The court's holding was based on the Agency's record,
which showed a high degree of threat to the bull trout that
belied the low-priority ranking it was given. 118 This deci-
sion should persuade the FWS to consider more carefully
its future determinations of priority rank.
D. The Parallel MMPA "Depleted" Listing Process
An alternative to an ESA listing is a "depleted" listing
under the. MMPA, "19 which constitutes a lower standard of
classification, but a similar lower level of protection. 2 ° An
animal qualifies for a "depleted" classification under section
3 of the MMPA if:
(a) [The Secretary, after consultation with the
Marine Mammal Commission and the
Committee of Scientific Advisors on Marine
Mammals, determines that a species or
population stock is below its optimum sus-
tainable population [hereinafter (OSP)I; or
(b) [A] State, to which authority for the conser-
vation and management of a species or
population stock is transferred. . . , deter-
mines that such species or stock is below
its [OSPI; or
(c) [A] species or population stock is listed as
an endangered species or a threatened spe-
cies under the Endangered Species Act of
1973. 121
In the MMPA, OSP is defined: "[Wlith respect to any
population stock, as the number of animals which will re-
sult in the maximum productivity of the population or the
species, keeping in mind the optimum carrying capacity of
117. Lieben, supra note 94, at 1348 (citing O'Keefe's Inc. v. United
States Consumer Prot. Safety Comm'n, 92 F.3d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 1996).
118. Id.
119. Proposed Depleted Designation, supra note 20, at 56299.
120. Id.
121. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(1)(a)-(c) (2000).
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the habitat and the health of the ecosystem of which they
form a constituent element."122
Through the use of such tools as aerial surveys and
abundance estimates, it was determined that the Cook
Inlet stock of beluga whales was well below their OSP.'23
Therefore, the NMFS was required to list the stock as "de-
pleted."12 4
The purpose of a "depleted" listing is to reverse the de-
cline, and promote recovery of the stock of beluga
whales. 125 The most important function of a "depleted" list-
ing is the restriction of subsistence harvests of depleted
populations.126 This becomes important to comanagement
agreements in that enforcement is necessary to create a
proper balance for the agreement.'27
IV. COMANAGEMENT
A. Problems with the ESA and Political Pressure Combine
to Create a Viable Alternative to Listing
Section 119 of the MMPA provides for the option of co-
management agreements. 2 The purpose of these agree-
ments is to bring native knowledge, practices, and man-
agement systems into fish and wildlife management,
122. Id. § 1362(9) (2000). NMFS defines OSP as: a population size
which falls within a range from the population level of a given species or
stock which is the largest supportable within the ecosystem (K) to the popu-
lation level that results in maximum net productivity (MNPL). Maximum
net productivity is the greatest net annual increment in the population
numbers or biomass resulting from additions to the population due to re-
production and/or losses due to natural mortality. 50 C.F.R. § 216.3
(2000).
123. Designation of the Cook Inlet, Alaska, Stock of Beluga Whale as
Depleted Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 65 Fed. Reg.
34590-97, 345961 (2000) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 216)[hereinafter
Depleted Designation]. 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (2000).
124. Id.
125. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000).
126. Id.
127. Depleted Designation, supra note 123, at 34590.
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1388 (2000).
resulting in the sharing of responsibility by indigenous
peoples and the federal government regarding management
functions.'29 These management functions usually include
research, regulation, allocation, and enforcement. 1
30
The MMPA states that the federal government may not
regulate the taking of marine mammals unless there is a
finding that the stock is depleted."3 ' Therefore, the "de-
pleted" finding is necessary to a comanagement agreement,
as it allows the federal government to work with indigenous
peoples in restricting and enforcing native takes.'3 2
Particularly in the harvest of marine mammals, Alaskan
Natives have played an active part in comanagement du-
ties. 1 This can be done through action by tribes or
through commissions particular to species."3 4 An example
of such a commission is the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Com-
mission (AEWC),3 s which entered into an agreement with
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) to regulate and enforce whaling by their people,
with NOAA serving a mere backup function. 1
36
B. Goals of Comanagement
Both commissions and individual tribes can approach
the federal government about their involvement in coman-
agement. ' T Some of the commissions include the AEWC,
the Cook Inlet Marine Mammal Council, the Eskimo Wal-
rus Commission, and the Alaska Beluga Whale Commit-
tee.13 Because multiple parties approach the federal gov-
ernment, particular attention is necessary to ensure that
129. Eric Smith, Some Thoughts on Comanagement, 4 HASTINGS W.-NW.
J. ENVrL. L. & PoL'Y 1 (1997).
130. Id. at 2.
131. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (2000).
132. Id.
133. Smith, supranote 129, at 1.
134. Id. at 2.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 6.
138. Id.
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those interested in comanagement do not overlap.13 9 A lim-
ited amount of funding in section 119 of the MMPA re-
quires the utmost level of cooperation and coordination be-
tween the commissions and tribes."14
The main structure of a comanagement agreement usu-
ally addresses management functions, dispute resolution,
and funding.'4 1 Management functions include research,
regulation, allocation, and enforcement.'4 2 A balance must
be struck by the native organizations and the government
as to who and to what extent each body is responsible for
each function.' Dispute resolution is needed when the
native organizations and the government disagree on com-
ponents of the agreement, such as the meaning of "health
of a wildlife population." 144
Funding played a large role in the success of comanage-
ment agreements. 145 Funding comes in a variety of forms.
It may be built into the comanagement agreement, as pre-
scribed in section 119 of the MMPA. 14' Funding may also
be obtained through contracting with a federal agency, or
receiving independent funding. 147 The latter worked espe-
cially well, playing a part in AEWC's success. 148 Limited
funding requires a native community to work together to
eliminate competition between the native tribes and organi-
zations and to allocate funding.14 9
The AEWC is responsible for all four forms of manage-
ment, which include conducting research, developing regu-
lations and whale quotas for each community, allocation of
funds and responsibilities, and enforcing those regula-
139. Id.
140. 16 U.S.C. § 1388 (2000).
141. Smith, supra note 129, at 5.
142. Id. at 1.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 9.
145. Id. at 6.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. David S. Case, Subsistence and Self-Determination: Can Alaska
Natives Have a More "Effective Voice?," 60 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1009, 1030-31
(1989).
149. Smith, supra note 129, at 9.
tions. 5 ° Although the AEWC has responsibility for all of
these functions, they collaborate with other whale biolo-
gists doing research, and participate in the process rather
than unilaterally deciding the quotas to be set. 151
The roles that indigenous people and government play
can differ tremendously. Alaskan Natives can have com-
plete enforcement control, by prefacing their management
with a requirement that the government stay only mini-
mally involved. '52 On the other hand, the government can
take a strong role in enforcement, giving tribal authorities
and commissions very little control, ultimately combining
to achieve a suitable balance. 153
C. Success Through Comanagement: the Cook Inlet Beluga
Whales
The development of comanagement is exemplified well by
the preservation of the Cook Inlet beluga whales. NMFS
received two petitions to list the Cook Inlet stock of beluga
whales as endangered under the ESA in March of 1999.154
The NMFS declined to list the species as threatened or en-
dangered based on the following findings: (1) Congress
passed legislation that stopped the harvest of Cook Inlet
beluga whales until October 1, 2000.155 Subsistence was
seen as the major factor in the species' decline, and was
therefore halted, allowing no takes in 1999.156 (2) The Cook
Inlet beluga whales were listed as depleted under the
MMPA, which imposed harvest restrictions on the stock. '57
(3) Preliminary data suggested that controlling the harvest
150. Id. at 3.
151. Milton Freeman, The Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission: Suc-
cessful Comanagement in Extreme Conditions, in Co-OPERATIVE MANAGEMENT
OF LOCAL FISHERIES (Evelyn Pinkerton ed., 1989).
152. Smith, supra note 129, at 3.
153. Id.
154. Regulations Governing the Taking and Importing Marine Mam-
mals; Endangered and Threatened Fish and Wildlife; Cook Inlet Beluga
Whales, 65 Fed. Reg. 38778 (June 22, 2000) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
216, 223, and 224).
155. Id. at 38779.
156. Id. at 38778-79.
157. Id. at 38779.
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would result in an effective recovery." 8 (4) Any recovery
plans must be preceded by an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) under the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA). 15 9
Currently, NMFS is in the process of preparing an EIS.16 1
NMFS, in apparent reliance on actions under the MMPA,
mentions that the decision not to list the Cook Inlet beluga
whales relies on one of the aforementioned mechanisms be-
ing in place by the expiration of the temporary legislation,
or by October 1, 2000.61
Although listing was denied, comanagement was an al-
ternative that NMFS was willing to explore.1 6 2 The federal
government had power to limit subsistence harvests be-
cause the belugas were "depleted."1 63 Through a combina-
tion of this power and the interest expressed by Alaskan
Natives, the Cook Inlet Marine Mammal Council (CIMMC)
and NMFS created a comanagement agreement allowing for
the take of one beluga whale in 2000. 14
NMFS has proposed a long-term mechanism for promot-
ing the recovery of this stock.16' NMFS will regulate the
harvest by imposing regulations such as: (1) Subsistence
hunting may only occur pursuant to an agreement between
NMFS and affected Alaska Native Organizations (ANOs).166
(2) The harvest is limited to two strikes annually until the
stock has recovered from its "depleted" status. 6 7 (3)The
sale of beluga whale products is strictly prohibited.1 61 (4)
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id
161. Id.
162. Taking of the Cook Inlet(CI), Alaska, Stock of Beluga Whales by
Alaska Natives, 65 Fed. Reg. 59164 (to be codified at 50 CFR 216) (Oct. 4.
2000) [hereinafter Taking].
163. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000).
164. Taking, supra note 162, at 59165.
165. Id.
166. Id. See also 16 U.S.C. § 1388 (2000) (stating that the Secretary
may enter into cooperative agreements with Alaskan Native organizations to
conserve marine mammals and provide comanagement of subsistence use
by Alaskan Natives).
167. Taking, supra note 162, at 59165.
168. Id. at 59165-66.
Any hunting will take place after July 15 of each year, to
minimize the harvest of a pregnant female. 16 9 (5) The taking
of newborn calves or adult whales with maternally depend-
ent calves is strictly prohibited. 70
With these regulations regarding population effects in
place, the comanagement agreement will clarify the de-
tails. 7 1 They proposed these regulations as a safety meas-
ure to ensure that there is no gap in protection of the
stock, but a comanagement agreement is still preferred and
pursued.172 NMFS is combining the benefits of a coman-
agement agreement with the added enforcement of regula-
tions in order to ensure the recovery of the Cook Inlet be-
luga whales. 73 As stated in the proposed regulations:
"NMFS believes it should work with the Native Cook Inlet
communities to develop a comanagement agreement that
protects and conserves CI [Cook Inlet] beluga whales while
preserving traditional beluga subsistence hunting activi-
ties." 17
4
V. CONCLUSION
Taking into consideration the ESA listing process and the
coordination of the MMPA listing process with the devel-
opment of comanagement agreements, it is apparent that
comanagement is a viable alternative to ESA listing. Not
only is the controversial stigma attached to "endangered or
threatened" listing avoided, but Alaskan Natives previously
viewed as enemies to species conservation measures are
included in the process. Alaskan Native views will finally
be heard. Not only do these natives have an interest in pre-
serving their culture, but they also have an interest in pre-
serving the whales that have been part of their culture for
so long. The ESA listing process has deteriorated through
postponed reauthorization, lack of funding, and bureau-
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 59167-68.
173. See Taking, supra note 162, at 59167-68.
174. Id. at 59168.
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cratic red tape. Comanagement is a fresh new outlook to a
species' survival. The coordination of Alaskan Natives and
administrative agencies recognizes a wide range of view-
points to utilize in the future. With ESA listings becoming
less and less effective, the future of our endangered species
lies in comanagement.
